

PERFECT STATES*

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ABSTRACT. Perfect predicates have been defined as stative. The purpose of this paper is to explain why. I will pay attention to both the resultative and the experiential Perfects. Contrary to Katz (2003), Nishiyama & Koenig (2004, 2010), Michaelis (2011) and Piñón (2014), the stativity of the Perfect will be derived from its nature as a content of grammatical Aspect. More precisely, I will assume that the Perfect allows us to make assertions regarding the state of affairs that follows an event that culminates or ceases (Klein 1992, 1994). In the case that we are dealing with the resultative Perfect, that state of affairs will be equated with the goal state of the subeventive structure of a telic predicate (García Fernández 2006). But if we are dealing with the experiential Perfect, the state of affairs will be equated with the final state of a process which ends up characterizing the subject as a participant in the type of event denoted by the verbal predicate.

Keywords. Grammatical Aspect; lexical Aspect; resultative Perfect; experiential Perfect; stativity; subeventive structure.

RESUMEN. Los predicados en Perfecto han sido definidos como estativos. El propósito de este trabajo es explicar por qué. Prestaré atención tanto al Perfecto resultativo como al Perfecto experiencial. En contra de Katz (2003), Nishiyama & Koenig (2004, 2010), Michaelis (2011) y Piñón (2014), la estatividad del Perfecto se derivará de su naturaleza como contenido de Aspecto gramatical. Más en concreto, asumiré que el Perfecto permite hacer afirmaciones con respecto al estado de cosas que sigue a un evento que culmina o cesa (Klein 1992, 1994). Si se trata del Perfecto resultativo, ese estado de cosas equivaldrá al estado meta de la estructura subeventiva de un predicado télico (García Fernández 2006). Si se trata del Perfecto experiencial, ese estado de cosas equivaldrá al estado final de un proceso que acaba caracterizando al sujeto como participante en el tipo de evento denotado por el predicado verbal.

Palabras clave. Aspecto gramatical; Aspecto léxico; Perfecto resultativo; Perfecto experiencial, estatividad; estructura subeventiva.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to clarify why the Perfect is characterized as stative. The studies that address the stativity of the Perfect are not very numerous. There are some mentions in Vet (1980), Vlach (1981, 1993), Harris (1982), Dik (1987), Moens (1987), Mittwoch (1988, 1995), Moens & Steedman (1988), Parsons (1990), Smith (1991), Kamp & Reyle (1993), Baar (1994), Bache (1994), ter Meulen (1995), van Eijck & Kamp (1997, 2010), Giorgi & Pianesi (1997), Depraetere (1998), de Swart (1998), Portner (2003) and Rothstein (2008), among others. However, as far as I know, the topic is dealt with in depth only in the papers by Katz (2003), Nishiyama &

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Koenig (2004, 2010), Michaelis (2011) and Piñón (2014). Briefly, Katz (2003) adopts a *resultant state* analysis. That means that Perfect predicates are thought to denote the state that results from the occurrence of the verbal event (Parsons 1990; Kamp & Reyle 1993). In Nishiyama & Koenig (2004, 2010) and Piñón (2014), the Perfect is responsible for the insertion of states into discourse. Their interpretation is determined lexically (especially with telic predicates) or contextually (with telic or atelic predicates). Finally, according to Michaelis (2011) the Perfect is a grammatical mechanism of aspectual coercion to obtain stative predicates.

These approaches immediately lead us to pose some questions. Firstly, the occurrence of the event can be affirmed both in the Perfect and in the Perfective readings of a sentence like *Juan había limpiado la piscina a las tres* ('Juan had cleaned the swimming pool at three'). Consequently, there would be a resultant state in both cases, i.e. the swimming pool being clean. Why not maintain then that not only a predicate with Perfect interpretation but also a predicate with Perfective interpretation denotes a state?

Secondly, it is not clear what the linguistic status of the state introduced by the Perfect is. Is it only necessary at the interpretation level? Is it also necessary at the syntactic level? The evidence displayed in section 3 points to the second solution. However, how could a contextually determined state be managed syntactically?

Finally, it is often said that at the origin of the phenomenon of coercion there is some conflict between the semantic properties of a selector item (either a construction, a word, or a morpheme) and the semantic properties of an unexpected selected item (Lauwers & Willems 2011). How could the Perfect fit this conception of coercion as a mechanism to amend possible mismatches? In Michaelis' terms, the Perfect would not change non-stative predicates into stative predicates occasionally, i.e. whenever there would be a conflict, but systematically, i.e. as a consequence of the morphological process to obtain the present perfect, the past perfect or the future perfect.

These questions prove that the problem is far from being solved. In this paper, I will derive the supposed stativity of the Perfect from its nature as a content of grammatical Aspect. Like Klein (1992, 1994), I will assume that the Perfect allows us to make assertions regarding the state of affairs that follows the verbal event. In order to restrict that state of affairs, I will adopt the typology of events of Moreno Cabrera (2003). My hypothesis is that the Perfect always brings into focus final or goal states that take part in the subeventive structure of the verbal predicates. This approach is original with respect to the explanation of the stativity of the Perfect. However, there is a major obstacle to face: the variety known as *experiential* Perfect. Unlike the *resultative* Perfect interpretation of a compound tense, the experiential Perfect reading can be obtained with atelic predicates, i.e. with predicates whose subeventive structure lacks goal states. My proposal is that the experiential Perfect is a grammatical procedure to obtain changes of state caused by the participation of the subject in the type of event denoted by the verbal predicate.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to distinguishing both the contents of Perfective and Perfect Aspect (section 2.1), and the grammatical behavior of the Perfect varieties that I am interested in: the resultative and the experiential (section 2.2). In section 3, I collect the evidence provided in the literature to defend the stativity of the Perfect. In section 4, I develop my proposal to account for the stativity of the resultative and the experiential Perfects. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions. The examples will be taken from standard European Spanish.

2. The Perfect Aspect

2.1. *Perfective vs. Perfect readings*


Compound tenses can receive two interpretations.¹ Consider the sentence in (1). In the interpretation that I will call *Perfective*, Juan started to clean the swimming pool at three. Shortly after the swimming pool was clean. In the interpretation that I will call *Perfect*, Juan cleaned the swimming pool before three:²

- (1) Juan había limpiado la piscina a las tres.
Juan have:PST.IPFV.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool at the:F.PL three
 ‘Juan had cleaned the swimming pool at three.’

a. *Perfective reading:*



b. *Perfect reading:*



The compound tense in (2) is not an exception. This sentence is unacceptable in the Perfect reading:³

- (2) #Juan ha limpiado la piscina a las tres.
Juan have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool at the:F.PL three
 ‘Juan has cleaned the swimming pool at three.’

Besides their aspectual contents, all verbal forms make temporal indications. For instance, the past perfect in the Perfect reading is an absolute past, i.e. it expresses anteriority with respect to the axis of the temporal deixis: the speech time. On the other hand, the past perfect in the Perfective reading is a past in the past, i.e. it expresses anteriority with respect to a past time of reference. The present perfect of (2) can only be interpreted as Perfective. As a tense, it is an absolute past of the present sphere. In other words, it expresses anteriority in a section of the temporal line that includes the time of speech.⁴ A present perfect with a Perfect reading would be a

¹ The Spanish anterior past *hube limpiado* [*have:PST.PFV.3SG clean:PST.PTCP*] is an exception. See García Fernández (2008) for its consideration as a variety of the Perfective Aspect.

² With regard to the double interpretation of compound tenses, see Comrie (1976: 56, 1981: 28, 1985: 66), Hornstein (1977: 531, 1981: 127-128, 1990: 21), Korzen & Vikner (1980: 110), Rivière (1980: 114), Bertinetto (1982: 62, 1986: 62), Declerck (1986: 325, 1991: 40, 230), Mittwoch (1988: 216, 1995: 257), Lo Cascio (1995: 281), García Fernández (1996: 123-124), Carrasco Gutiérrez (1998: 162-200, 239-277), among others.

³ The hot news and the experiential readings should be disregarded at this moment (see the example 7b below and section 2.2, respectively). The combinations of the present perfect with definite time expressions like *a las tres* (‘at three’) are far more restricted in English than in Spanish. See Klein (1992) for what is called *the present perfect puzzle*.

⁴ For the concept of *temporal sphere*, see Declerck (2006: 147-152).


present. Consequently, the sentence in (2) is unacceptable for the same reason as (3). The verbal forms that express simultaneity with the speech time cannot be modified by temporal expressions like *a las tres* ('at three'): (I am not taking into account either the interpretation of habitual present or the interpretation of present *pro* future.)

- (3) #Juan está tumbado en su cama a las tres.
Juan ESTAR:PRS.3SG lie:PST.PTCP in POSS.3SG bed at the:F.PL three
 'Juan is lying on his bed at three.'


Without the temporal expression, the present perfect can be interpreted either as Perfective or as Perfect. See (4):

- (4) Juan ha limpiado la piscina.
Juan have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool
 'Juan ha limpiado la piscina.'

a. *Perfective reading:*



b. *Perfect reading:*



The formulas in (5) are meant to represent the two temporal meanings of the past perfect and the present perfect. I assume with Reichenbach (1947) that all temporal meanings can be obtained from the different combinations of a limited number of theoretical primitives. Oversimplifying, I will suppose that those primitives are the speech time (ST), the reference time (RT) and the topic time (TT), i.e. the time that is located on the temporal line with respect to the time of reference. As in Hornstein (1990), the temporal primitives are combined in pairs. The temporal relations of anteriority and posteriority are represented by means of a hyphen, and the temporal relation of simultaneity by means of a comma. The symbol \circ represents composition. If the reference time is anterior to the speech time, the tense belongs to the past sphere. If the reference time is simultaneous with the speech time, the tense belongs to the present sphere:⁵

- (5) a. *Past perfect (Perfective):* (TT-RT) \circ (RT-ST)
 b. *Past perfect (Perfect):* (RT,TT) \circ (RT-ST)
 c. *Present perfect (Perfective):* (TT-RT) \circ (ST,TT)
 d. *Present perfect (Perfect):* (RT,TT) \circ (ST,TT)⁶

⁵ For simplicity, I will ignore the future perfect and the conditional perfect (see Carrasco Gutiérrez 1998).

⁶ The temporal formula of (5d) corresponds to a present tense. Effectively, the temporal meanings of the simple present and the present perfect (in its Perfect interpretation) are the same. There is just one difference related to their aspectual contents. As we know, the present perfect does not locate on the temporal line the time of the event, but the time of the state of affairs that follows the event (see 6b).

TT stands for the time that the information of grammatical Aspect makes visible. Following Klein (1992, 1994), I will represent the time of the verbal situation (TSIT) by means of hyphens, a time anterior or posterior by means of crosses, and the TT by means of square brackets, as in (6). All aspectual contents contribute to the establishment of a particular non-deictic relationship between TSIT and TT. As we see in (6a), what characterizes the content of Perfective Aspect is the inclusion relation of TSIT in TT. What characterizes the content of Perfect Aspect is that it focuses on part of the time of the state of affairs that follows TSIT. This implies that in the temporal formulas for the Perfective tenses of (5a) and (5c), TT would be equivalent to the entire time of the situation denoted by the verbal predicate. In the temporal formulas for the Perfect tenses of (5b) and (5d), TT would correspond to a time posterior to the verbal event:⁷

- (6) a. PERFECTIVE ASPECT: + + + [+ - - - - - +] + + +
 b. PERFECT ASPECT: - - - - - + + [+ + + +] + + +

The verbal forms that are considered stative are the ones with Perfect reading. In section 3, I will present some of the evidence that has supported this point of view. But first, in section 2, I will pay attention to the properties on which the distinction between the resultative and the experiential Perfect is based. In the papers that deal with the stativity of the Perfect, attention is mainly paid to the former. As I mentioned in the introduction, though, the challenge is to account for the stativity of the latter.

In the literature on the English present perfect, two more types of Perfects have been distinguished: the *continuative* or *universal* (7a), and the *hot news* (7b).⁸ With the continuative, TSIT starts in the past and reaches the reference time. With the hot news, it is possible to make assertions about events whose occurrence is close to the time of reference:

- (7) a. He vivido en Soria desde los quince años.
 have:PRS.ISG live:PST PTCP in Soria since the:M.PL fifteen years
 ‘I have lived in Soria since I was fifteen years old.’
 b. Ha votado solo el 40% del electorado.
 have:PRS.3SG vote:PST PTCP only the:M.SG 40% of:the:M.SG electorate.
 ‘Only 40% of the electorate has voted.’

In this paper, I will confine myself to the resultative and the experiential Perfects. Examples like the ones in (7) will be ignored. The continuative has been classified as a variety of the Perfective Aspect in Spanish (García Fernández 2004). Likewise, the interpretation of the hot news might be seen as a consequence of the present perfect (in its Perfective interpretation) being a past of the present sphere.

This connection between a present state of affairs and a past event is often attributed to the capacity of the present perfect to extend the present time backwards. This is known as the *interpretation of the extended now* (McCoard 1978).

⁷ The original definition of Perfective Aspect than can be found in Klein (1992: 537) is the following: “TT including end of TSit and beginning of time after TSit”. For the definition I adopt, see Smith (1991: 103). I take the diagram in (6a) from García Fernández (2000: 50).

⁸ For the distinction in English between the *continuative*, the *hot news*, the *resultative* and the *experiential* Perfects, see, among many others, Leech (1971), McCawley (1971, 1981), Comrie (1976, 1985), McCoard (1978), Dahl (1985), Fenn (1987), Declerck (1991, 2006), Michaelis (1994), Kiparsky (2002), Katz (2003), Portner (2003), Mittwoch (2008), Rothstein (2008), Nishiyama & Koenig (2010).

2.2. Resultative Perfect vs. Experiential Perfect

In his classic book, Comrie establishes the following difference between the *resultative* (8) and the *experiential* (also *existential* or *indefinite*) Perfects (9):

- (8) RESULTATIVE PERFECT:
 a. “In the perfect of result, a present state is referred to as being the result of some past situation.” (Comrie 1976: 56)
 b. [Voy a dar=me un baño, que] Juan ha limpiado
go:PRS.ISG to give:INF=me:DAT a:M.SG bath, that Juan have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP
 la piscina.
the:F.SG swimming.pool
 ‘[I am going to take a bath, because] Juan has cleaned the swimming pool.’
- (9) EXPERIENTIAL PERFECT:
 a. “The experiential perfect indicates that a given situation has held at least once during some time in the past leading up to the present.” (Comrie 1976: 58)
 b. [Ahora te toca a ti, que] Juan ha limpiado
now you:DAT touch:PRS.3SG to you:OBL, that Juan have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP
 la piscina en otras ocasiones.
the:F.SG swimming.pool in other:F.PL times.
 ‘[Now it’s your turn, because] Juan has cleaned the swimming pool some other times.’

If the references to the present time are not considered, it is possible to use these definitions with all compound tenses in their Perfect readings. With the resultative Perfect we make an assertion about a state that would be the result of a previous situation. With the experiential Perfect, the state would characterize the subject as a participant in an event that has happened at least once in a temporal period that includes the reference time. This semantic distinction can be supported by different grammatical properties.

A. In the experiential Perfect reading (EPR), the verb can be modified by quantifying expressions; in the resultative Perfect reading (RPR) it cannot (Mittwoch 2008: 326, 328). So, the present perfect in (10) can only receive an EPR. The reason is that experiences can have their origin in more than one event. On the contrary, there are no states that are the result of multiple events.⁹

⁹ Mittwoch (2008: 342-343) calls this property *singularity*:

But since the Strong Resultative perfect requires a telic predicate, and its target state has to hold at the P[erfect]E[valuation]p[oin]t, the state and the event have to be singular. There is only one state of the door being locked now, and this state can only be caused by a single locking event; otherwise there would have to be intermediate events and states.

Examples like *Mary has bought two cars* or *Most people have locked their doors* are not exceptions. The fact that we can get anaphoric reference to the event with simple *it* proves that *two cars* or *most people* do not behave as plural arguments:

- (i) Mary has bought two cars. It happened after she won the lottery.
 (ii) Most people have locked their doors; it’s because a suspicious character was seen prowling around in the neighbourhood.
 [Examples (58a) and (58b) in Mittwoch (2008: 343).]

- (10) Juan ya ha limpiado la piscina en varias
Juan already have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool in several:F.PL
 ocasiones.¹⁰
times
 ‘Juan has already cleaned the swimming pool several times.’

B. Similarly, two coordinated compound tenses, as in (11a), can admit the RPR whenever the assertions are also two (11b). In other words, the present perfects of the examples must locate on the time line the resultant states of both the event of cleaning the swimming pool and the event of preparing the barbecue. If the assertion is just one, the RPR is excluded. Consider (12a). The relevant interpretation is that the present perfects locate on the time line the resultant state of a unique complex event (Michaelis 1994: 149-150; Mittwoch 2008: 326):

- (11) a. Juan ya ha limpiado la piscina y
Juan already have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool and
 preparado la barbacoa.
prepared:PST.PTCP the:F.SG barbecue.
 ‘Juan has already cleaned the swimming pool and prepared the barbecue.’
 b. ✓*Experiential* / ✓*Resultative*:
 [Have already (Juan clean the swimming pool)] & [Have already (Juan
 prepare the barbecue)]
- (12) a. Juan ya ha limpiado la piscina y
Juan already have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool and
 preparado la barbacoa después.
prepared:PST.PTCP the:F.SG barbecue after.
 ‘Juan has already cleaned the swimming pool and prepared the barbecue
 afterwards.’
 b. ✓*Experiential* / #*Resultative*:
 Have already [(Juan clean the swimming pool)] & after [(Juan prepare the
 barbecue)]

C. A verbal form with RPR cannot be used to describe in more detail an event pragmatically presupposed (Michaelis 1994: 143). That explains the contrast in (13) and (14B). In (13) the resultative Perfect is used to provide information about a new situation: the state of the swimming pool being clean. In (14A), the cleaning of the swimming pool is taken for granted. That is why (14B) is not felicitous:

- (13) Puedes bañar=te, que Juan ya ha limpiado la
can:PRS.2SG bath:INF=YOU.AC that Juan already have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG
 piscina.
swimming.pool
 ‘You can take a bath because Juan has already cleaned the swimming pool.’
- (14) A: ¡No hay ni un solo insecto flotando en la piscina!
not HABER:PRS.3SG nor a:M.SG single:M.SG insect float:GER in the:F.SG swimming.pool
 ‘There is not a single insect floating in the swimming pool.’
 B: #Juan ya ha limpiado la piscina.

¹⁰ When necessary, the adverb *ya* (‘already’) will be used to indicate that only the Perfect reading is being taken into account (Vlach 1981: 68).

Juan already have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool
 ‘Juan has already cleaned the swimming pool.’

The *wh*- questions are structures to demand information on an event that it is presupposed pragmatically. Thus, in this type of sentences the RPR would be excluded. The examples in (15) show that this prediction is borne out:¹¹

- (15) a. #¿Quién ya había limpiado la piscina a
who already have:PST.IPFV.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool at
 las tres?
the:F.PL three
 ‘Who had already cleaned the swimming pool at three?’
 b. #¿Cuándo Juan ya había limpiado la piscina?
when Juan already have:PST.IPFV.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool?
 ‘When had Juan already cleaned the swimming pool?’

As we see in (16B), a compound tense with EPR can be used to provide information about a presupposed event, and, consequently, we can find it in *wh*-questions (17):

- (16) A: ¡No hay monumento en París que Juan no conozca!
not HABER:PRS.3SG monument in Paris that Juan not know:PRS.3SG
 ‘There is no monument in Paris that Juan doesn’t know!’
 B: Sí, Juan ya ha visitado París al menos tres veces.
yes, Juan already have:PRS.3SG visit:PST.PTCP Paris to.the:M.SG least three times
 ‘Yes, Juan has already visited Paris at least three times.’
 (17) ¿Quién ha visitado París? Que levante la mano.
who have:PRS.3SG visit:PST.PTCP Paris that raise:PRS.SBJV.3SG the:F.SG hand
 ‘Who has visited Paris? Raise your hand.’

On the same lines, the RPR is ruled out if the verb is one of creation (18a) or one of transfer (18b, c), where the speaker is the uninstantiated recipient, and the complement is either a definite DP or a pronominal anaphora (Michaelis 1994: 144-145):

- (18) a. ¡Mira! Juan ha pintado {un pequeño cuadro/^{??}el pequeño
look:IMP.2SG Juan have:PRS.3SG paint:PST.PTCP a:M.SG little picture/the:M.SG little
 cuadro}.
picture
 ‘Look, Juan has painted a little picture/the little picture.’
 b. ¡Qué amables! Mis compañeros han enviado un ramo
how kind:PL POSS:1PL colleagues have:PRS.3PL send:PST.PTCP a:M.SG bouquet/
 de flores.
of flowers
 ‘How kind! My colleagues have sent a bouquet of flowers.’
 c. ^{??}¿Qué amables! Mis compañeros lo han enviado.
how kind:PL POSS:1PL colleagues it:ACC have:PRS.3PL send:PST.PTCP

¹¹ The causal *wh*- questions are exceptions, e.g. *¿Por qué había Juan llenado ya la piscina a las tres?* (‘Why had Juan already cleaned the swimming pool at three?’) (Michaelis 1994: 146).

‘How kind! My colleagues have sent it.’

Definite DPs and pronominal anaphoras are connected to existential presuppositions. In (18a) with the definite DP *el pequeño cuadro* (‘the little picture’) and in (18c) with the pronominal anaphora *lo* (‘it’) the existence of the picture and the identifiability of the theme argument would be presupposed, respectively. Therefore the painting and the transfer events connected to them would also be presupposed. That is why the RPR is proscribed: these sentences would provide additional information about presupposed events, e.g. the identity of the painter in (18a) and the identity of the senders in (18c).

The EPR is also impossible, but for a different reason. The event denoted by a compound tense with EPR must be repeatable (McCawley 1971; Inoue 1978; Dahl 1985; Michaelis 1994; Katz 2003). However, the definite DP forces a single occurrence of the event reading.¹²

D. In the EPR, the verb can be modified by indefinite temporal expressions. In the RPR, it cannot. Consider (19). This sentence admits both the RPR and the EPR. In order to obtain these interpretations, *en mayo* (‘in May’) must refer to a definite period of time, i.e. the fifth month of the year considered. If *en mayo* refers to an indefinite period of time, i.e. no matter which month of May, the RPR is excluded (Michaelis 1994: 147):

- (19) Juan ya había limpiado la piscina en mayo.
Juan already have·PST·IPFV.3SG *clean*·PST·PTCP *the*·F.SG *swimming.pool* *in May*
 ‘Juan had already cleaned the swimming pool in May.’

E. In the EPR, the verb can be modified by adverbial expressions of manner. In the RPR, it cannot (Michaelis 1994: 150-15; Mittwoch 2008: 329-330).¹³ So, the past perfect of (20) must be considered as an example of experiential Perfect:

- (20) Juan ya había limpiado la piscina
Juan already have·PST·IPFV.3SG *clean*·PST·PTCP *the*·F.SG *swimming.pool*
conscientemente.
conscientiously
 ‘Juan had already cleaned the swimming pool conscientiously.’

(21) is not an exception. The past perfect can be regarded as an example of both experiential and resultative Perfect. However, note that *herméticamente* (‘hermetically’) does not describe how the event of closing the drawer has taken place, but the way the drawer is closed. That is, *herméticamente* is a modifier of the goal state:

¹² Similarly, the EPR would be ruled out if the event is by its very nature a once-only event:

- (i) John has died.
 (ii) The Prime Minister has held his first press conference.
 (iii) Anne has uttered her first two-word sentence.
 [Examples (11a-c), in Mittwoch (2008: 327).]

For a discussion of this kind of examples, and for considering the condition of repeatability of the EPR in certain circumstances as a special case of the more general phenomenon of *lifetime effects*, see Mittwoch (2008: 327, 344-345).

¹³ For the idea that states, in general, do not admit adverbs of manner, see Vlach (1981: 67, 1993: 239).

- (21) Juan ya había cerrado el cajón herméticamente.
Juan already have:PST.IPFV.3SG close:PST.PTCP the:M.SG drawer hermetically.
 ‘Juan had already closed the drawer hermetically.’

F. In the EPR, the verb can co-occur with internal arguments projected as bare NPs. In the RPR, it cannot (22a). As shown in (22b-d), the bare NPs render the sentence ungrammatical if the verbal event is required to be bounded (Bosque 1996: 30-34). The requirement of the event boundedness is due, in (22a), to the RPR; in (22c), to the presence of the aspectual pronoun *se* (cf. 22b, without *se*); and in (22d), to the verb *apurar* (‘drain’), which lexically incorporates a natural *telos* (cf. 22b, with *beber*, ‘drink’):

- (22) a. #Juan ya había bebido vino.
Juan already have:PST.IPFV.3SG drink:PST.PTCP wine
 ‘Juan had already drunk wine.’
 b. Juan bebió {vino/el vino}.
Juan drink:PST.PFV.3SG wine/the:M.SG wine
 ‘Juan drank wine/the wine.’
 c. Juan se bebió {*vino/ el vino}.
Juan SE:3SG drink:PST.PFV.3SG wine/the:M.SG wine
 ‘Juan drank wine/the wine down.’
 d. Juanapuró {*vino/ el vino}.
Juan drain:PST.PFV.3SG wine/the:M.SG wine
 ‘Juan drained glass of wine/his glass of wine dry.’

The differences just displayed demonstrate the pertinence of the grammatical distinction between the RPR and the EPR. Nevertheless, there is an important property that compound tenses with Perfect interpretation have in common: their stativity.¹⁴ This is the topic of the following section.

3. Stativity Tests

Now, I will review six tests proposed in the literature to prove the stativity of the Perfect. Whenever it is possible, I will employ non-finite verbal forms. The reason is that most of the claims related to the behavior of the English stative predicates are not extensible to Spanish, unless we use Imperfective verbal forms in our translations. In using infinitives, I intend to keep apart the properties derived from a predicate’s belonging to a particular lexical class and the properties derived from its aspectual morphology.¹⁵

A. First of all, if a stative predicate is modified by a punctual temporal expression, an overlapping relationship can be established. On the contrary, with non-stative predicates the overlapping relationship is not possible. Consider (23). In (23a), the

¹⁴ Stative predicates cannot be combined with the progressive periphrasis (Bennett & Partee 1972; Taylor 1977; Vlach 1981, 1993). Katz (2003: ex. 3) mentions this same property to argue for the stativity of the Perfect: **John is having kissed Mary*. Nonetheless, both in English and in Spanish, it is possible to find examples like *Juan ha estado besando a María* (‘Juan has been kissing Mary’). These examples show that the ungrammaticality of the Katz’s sentence is due not to the incompatibility of the Perfect with the progressive periphrasis, but to the different scopes of the aspectual auxiliaries *be* and *have*.

¹⁵ This is, of course, a very complex topic which deserves more attention.

time of the event of the subordinate clause and the time of the event denoted by the stative predicate of the main clause overlap. In (23b), the time of the event of the subordinate clause precedes the time of the event denoted by the non-stative predicate of the main clause. If (23c) is now examined, it can be noticed that the temporal relation between the main and the subordinate clauses is the same as (23a), overlapping: they wanted the gifts to be wrapped by the arrival of their father (Vlach 1981: 67, 1993: 239-240; Moens 1987: 13, where the *accessibility test* of Vuyst 1983 is mentioned; Michaelis 2011: 1366-1367):

- (23) a. [Querían] *estar despiertos* cuando llegara su padre.
want:PST.IPFV.3PL ESTAR:INF awake:M.PL when arrive:PST.SBJV.3SG POSS:3SG father.
 ‘[they wanted] to be awake when their father arrived.’
- b. [Querían] *envolver los regalos* cuando llegara su padre.
want:PST.IPFV.3PL wrap:INF the:M.PL gifts when arrive:PST.SBJV.3SG POSS:3SG father.
 ‘[they wanted] to wrap the gifts when their father arrived.’
- c. [Querían] *haber envuelto los regalos* cuando llegara su padre.
want:PST.IPFV.3PL have:INF wrap:PST.PTCP the:M.PL gifts when arrive:PST.SBJV.3SG POSS:3SG father.
 ‘[they wanted] to have wrapped the gifts when their father arrived.’

The *present-tense reporting test* (see section B, below) and the *indirect-discourse test* (see section C) can be considered as extensions of the test above, given that both the event of speech and the events of the main clauses are conceived as punctual (see Carrasco Gutiérrez 1998 and the references given there).

B. According to the present-tense reporting test, a stative situation can overlap with and, therefore, take place at the utterance time, a non-stative situation cannot (Michaelis 2011: 1368-1369). Consider (24b). The most natural interpretation of (24b) is the habitual one (Vlach 1993: 239). In other words, (24b) is preferably taken as the description of a subject’s custom. In order for (24b) to be taken as the description of the event in which the subject is involved at the speech time, we need a pragmatically non-neutral context, e.g. a video recording of somebody’s skill at cleaning the swimming pool. Neither (24a) nor (24c) admits a habitual interpretation:

- (24) a. La piscina está limpia.
the:F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR:PRS.3SG clean:F.SG
 ‘The swimming pool is clean.’
- b. Limpio la piscina ... #(y grito un “al agua
clean:PRS.1SG the:F.SG swimming.pool and shout:PRS.1SG a:M.SG to.the:F.SG water patos” cada tarde).
ducks every afternoon
 ‘I clean the swimming pool (and I shout: “into the water everybody!” every afternoon).’
- c. La piscina ya se ha limpiado.
the:F.SG swimming.pool already SE:3SG have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP
 ‘The swimming pool has already been cleaned.’

C. In the indirect discourse test, there is an overlapping relationship between the time of the event denoted by the embedded stative predicate and the time of the event of the main clause (see 25a). In contrast, the time of the event denoted by the

embedded non-stative predicate is necessarily anterior (Michaelis 2011: 1367). This explains the ungrammaticality of (25b) with the simple infinitive and the grammaticality of the same sentence with the compound infinitive. On the one hand, the event denoted by the predicate *limpiar la piscina* ('clean the swimming pool') is not a state; and on the other hand, the simple infinitive cannot express anteriority, unlike the compound infinitive. Once again compound tenses with Perfect interpretation behave as stative predicates (see 25c):

- (25) a. María dijo *llevar puesto* el vestido de la
María say:PST.PFV.3SG carry:INF put.on:PST.PTCP the:M.SG costume of the:F.SG
 graduación.
graduation
 'María said that she was wearing her graduation costume.'
- b. María dijo {**comprar/haber comprado*} el vestido de la
María say:PST.PFV.3SG buy:INF /have:INF buy:PST.PTCP the:M.SG costume of the:F.SG
 graduación.
graduation
 'María said that she bought/had bought her graduation costume.'
- c. María dijo *haber comprado ya* el vestido de la
María say:PST.PFV.3SG have:INF buy:PST.PTCP already the:M.SG dress of the:F.SG
 graduación.
graduation
 'María said that she had already bought her graduation costume.'

D. The *expansion test* shows that it is possible to coordinate a clause that has a stative predicate in the past with another clause in which the persistence of the state at the speech time is affirmed (see 26a). This coordination is not possible if the predicate is non-stative (see 26b). In (26c) we have a compound tense with Perfect interpretation. As expected, the coordination is not ruled out (Michaelis 2011: 1367-1368):

- (26) a. Ayer Juan confirmó *estar lleno* de sospechas. De hecho,
yesterday Juan confirm:PST.PFV.3SG ESTAR:INF full:M.SG of suspicions. Of fact,
 aún lo *está*.
still it:AC ESTAR:PRS.3SG
 'Yesterday Juan confirmed that he was full of suspicions. In fact, he still is.'
- b. Ayer Juan confirmó *haber llenado* la piscina.
yesterday Juan confirm:PST.PFV.3SG have:INF fill:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool
 (*De hecho, aún lo *hace*.)
of fact, still it:AC do:PRS.3SG
 'Yesterday Juan confirmed that he had filled the swimming pool. (In fact, he is still doing it.)'
- c. Ayer Juan confirmó *haber llenado ya* la
yesterday Juan confirm:PST.PFV.3SG have:INF fill:PST.PTCP already the:F.SG
 piscina. De hecho, *todavía está llena*.
swimming.pool. Of fact, still ESTAR:PRS.3SG full:F.SG
 'Yesterday Juan confirmed that he had already filled the swimming pool. In fact, it is still full.'

E. In Spanish, stative predicates are excluded from temporal clauses headed by *al* + infinitive (see the second example in 27B). The sentence in (28a) is not an exception. A stative predicate does not render the sentence ungrammatical if the clause headed by *al* + infinitive is not interpreted as temporal, but as causal. Observe in (27B) and (28b) that the predicates with Perfect reading exhibit the same behavior as the stative ones (see García Fernández 2000: 283 and the references given there):

- (27) A: ¿Cuándo comenzaron a andar?
when start:PST.PFV.3PL to walk:INF
 ‘When did they start to walk?’
 B: Al salir el sol/*Al estar despiertos /*Al
to.the:M.SG go.out:INF the:M.SG sun/to.the:M.SG ESTAR:INF awake:M.PI/to.the:M.SG
haber recogido ya sus sacos de dormir.
have:INF take.up:PST.PTCP already POSS:3PL bags of sleep:INF
 ‘At sunrise/As soon as they were awake/As soon as they have already taken up their sleeping bags.’
- (28) a. Al sentir=se mejor, comenzaron a andar.
to.the:M.SG feel:INF= SE:3SG better, start:PST.PFV.3PL to walk:INF
 ‘As they feel better, they started walking.’
 b. Al haber=se repuesto del cansancio del día
to.the:M.SG have:INF= SE:3SG recover:PST.PTCP of.the:M.SG fatigue of.the:M.SG day
anterior, comenzaron a andar.
previous:M.SG start:PST.PFV.3PL to walk:INF
 ‘As they have recovered from the fatigue of the previous day, they started walking.’

F. Finally, with stative predicates the modal auxiliary *deber* (‘must’) can receive an epistemic interpretation. On the contrary, with non-stative predicates the auxiliary is preferably interpreted as deontic. Compare (29a) and (29b). Katz (2003) attributes this behavior to the stative predicates’ orientation to the present. The epistemic reading is compatible with this orientation. Instead, the deontic reading implies an orientation to the future.¹⁶ As before, (29c) shows that there is no difference between a compound tense with Perfect reading and a stative predicate: (The preposition *de*, ‘of’, next to the modal auxiliary is used to force the epistemic reading.)

- (29) a. La piscina debe de estar limpia.
the:F.SG swimming.pool must:PRS.3SG of ESTAR:INF clean:F.SG

¹⁶ There is another way to test the stative predicates’ orientation to the present: embed them in clauses introduced by verbs like *believe* or *think* in the past. The embedded clauses would then denote past beliefs or thoughts that are still relevant at the utterance time (see ii and iii). Non-stative predicates are excluded (see i):

- (i) ??Thelma believed Hans to kiss Lin.
 (ii) Thelma believed Hans to love Lin.
 (iii) Thelma believed Hans to have kissed Lin.
 [Examples (16a), (16b) and (20b), in Katz (2003).]

In Spanish, these structures are not possible unless the main subject and the embedded subject are coreferential. Thus, there would be no difference between the Spanish examples parallel to the ones in (i)-(iii) and the Spanish examples in (25).

‘The swimming pool must be clean.’

b. #Juan debe de limpiar la piscina.

Juan must:PRS.3SG of clean:INF the:F.SG swimming.pool

‘Juan must be cleaning the swimming pool.’

c. La piscina debe de haber=se limpiado ya.

the:F.SG swimming.pool must:PRS.3SG of have:INF= SE:3SG clean:PST.PTCP already

‘The swimming pool must already have been cleaned.’

All the stativity tests have been illustrated with resultative Perfects. Observe in the following examples that the same results can be obtained with experiential Perfects:

(30) RELATION WITH A POINT:

a. Temporal expressions

[Querían] haber probado el sushi al menos un

want:PST.IPFV.3PL have:INF taste:PST.PTCP the:M.SG sushi to.the:M.SG least a:M.SG

par de veces cuando fueran al restaurante.

couple of times when go:PST.SBJV.3PL to.the:M.SG restaurant

‘[They wanted] to have tried the sushi at least a couple of times when they went to the restaurant.’

b. Present tense

He probado el sushi al menos un par de veces.

have:PRS.1SG taste:PST.PTCP the:M.SG sushi to.the:M.SG least a:M.SG couple of times

‘I have tried the sushi at least a couple of times.’

c. Indirect discourse

Dijo haber probado el sushi al menos un par

say:PST.PFV.3SG have:INF taste:PST.PTCP the:M.SG sushi to.the:M.SG least a:M.SG couple

de veces.

of times

‘S/He said that s/he has tried the sushi at least a couple of times.’

(31) EXPANSION:

Hace un mes dijo haber probado el sushi

do:PRS.3SG a:M.SG month say:PST.PFV.3SG have:INF taste:PST.PTCP the:M.SG sushi

al menos un par de veces. De hecho ahora lo ha

to.the:M.SG least a:M.SG couple of times. Of fact now it:AC have:PRS.3SG

probado cuatro veces.

taste:PST.PTCP four times

‘A month ago s/he said that s/he had tasted the sushi at least a couple of times.

In fact, now s/he had tasted it four times.’

(32) <AL + INFINITIVE>:

Al haber probado el sushi al menos un par de

to.the:M.SG have:INF taste:PST.PTCP the:M.SG sushi to.the:M.SG least a:M.SG couple of

veces, fueron al restaurante más tranquilos.

times, go:PST.PFV.3PL to.the:M.SG restaurant more relaxed:M.PL

‘As they have tried the sushi at least a couple of times, they went to the restaurant more relaxed.’

(33) EPISTEMIC MODAL:

Juan debe de haber probado el sushi.

Juan must:PRS.3SG of have:INF taste:PST.PTCP the:M.SG sushi

‘Juan must have tried the sushi.’

The behavior exhibited by compound tenses with Perfect readings with regard to the stativity tests is really surprising: Why would a verbal form that locates TT as posterior to TSIT resemble a stative predicate? In fact, this question connects with a more intriguing one: What is there after TSIT? In the last section of this paper I will provide an answer to those questions. Section 4.1 is devoted to the analysis of the RPR; section 4.2, to the analysis of the EPR. I will propose that compound tenses with Perfect readings behave as states because the Perfect is a morphological procedure to focus on the final state of the subeventive structure of the verbal predicate.

4. Perfect states as final states

To answer the question of what there is after the TSIT, I will take as a departing point the following quote: “the perfect locates the TT in the poststate of the corresponding situation” (Klein 1994: 9). With the term *poststate* the author refers both to the goal state of a telic situation (see 34a) and to the state that follows an atelic event (see 34b):¹⁷

- (34) a. Mary had left the room.
 - - - - - + + + + [+ + +] + + + + +
 b. Peter had stood in the doorway.
 - - - - - [. . .]
 [Examples (5) and (6), in Klein (1994: 8-9).]

The crosses represent the goal state. The dots represent the other type of state, which is not lexically restricted (Klein 1994: 9):

We do not know what was the case after Peter’s standing in the doorway, except that it is not standing in the doorway [...] It may be a state which results from Peter’s standing there, or it may not.

The difference between the RPR and the EPR would be one of temporal distance: in the RPR, TT must be located in the adjacent part of the time posterior to the TSIT. There is not such a requirement in the EPR. That is why the results of the situation can be annihilated (Klein 1994: 112):

In this case [i.e. the experiential perfect], the distance between TT and TSit is, or at least can be, much longer; in particular, TT need not be in the adjacent part of the posttime, if this part is distinguished from a subsequent part. Hence, the ensuing results of the situation, if there are any, may have been annihilated since TSit.

In my view, this approach has a clear-cut advantage: the Perfect is not believed to insert states into discourse (cfr. Kamp y Reyle 1993; de Swart 1998; Nishiyama & Koenig 2010; Piñón 2014). The states would not be added. They would be present from the very beginning and could be focused on. In this sense, the Perfect would not

¹⁷ Contrary to what Nishiyama & Koenig (2010: 641) claim, in both cases, TT makes visible the time of a state:

In Klein’s view, all that the perfect introduces is a temporal interval that follows the described situation. However, it seems that the very notion of topic time (TT) –an interval about which an assertion is made- requires something like an eventuality description (possibly a state) to also be introduced by the perfect. Without anything to assert, how can there be an interval of time about which an assertion is made?

be anomalous. Like the other aspectual contents, the Perfect would involve a particular relationship between TT and TSIT.

Besides, in Klein (1994) attention is paid to a fact that is traditionally ignored: the Perfective content also makes visible the time of the state posterior to TSIT. Observe that there is a cross inside the right square bracket in the diagram of (6a), that I repeat for convenience:

(6a) PERFECTIVE ASPECT: + + + [+ - - - - - +] + + +

Both the Perfect and the Perfective imply that the verbal situation has ceased or culminated. Nevertheless, there is no paper that attributes to the Perfective the capacity of inserting a state or the mere relation with it (Klein 1994: 106):

The posttime of *John opened the window* is inevitably characterised by the fact that the window is open (for some time). The posttime of *John slept* is lexically not defined; it is just the state after some unspecified time of John's sleeping. John may be a bit dizzy still, or he may be fresh and relaxed. It is even not excluded, though pragmatically not very likely, that John is still sleeping.

Now, I want to mention some problems. Firstly, it is not possible to predict in grammatical terms what state the Perfect of an atelic predicate brings into focus. Why then is the Perfect of the atelic predicates considered as a grammatical resource to make assertions related to states that can only be contextually determined? Secondly, if it is assumed that the EPR differs from the RPR in the fact that there can be temporal distance between TT and the end of TSIT, it should be explained, on the one hand, why the RPR is obtained with telic predicates; and on the other hand, how the difference between the RPR and the EPR can be addressed when there is no such temporal distance and, consequently, the results are not annihilated.

In order to preserve the advantages of the analysis of Klein (1994) and to avoid its disadvantages, I am going to maintain that the Perfect always focuses on a final state. In the RPR, this final state belongs to the subeventive structure of the verbal predicate (García Fernández 2006). This point of view is absolutely compatible with the common idea that this variety is lexically restricted to the telic predicates (see section 4.1). In the EPR, the final state does not take part in the subeventive structure of the verbal predicate. The EPR is not related to concrete events, but to types of events. My proposal is that the participation of the subject in one of those types of events would make her/him be involved in a change of state, i.e. in a transition between an initial and a final state (see section 4.2).

4.1. Final states in the resultative Perfect reading

In the RPR, the focus is on one part of the time of the state of affairs which is the result of the event denoted by the verbal predicate. In what follows, I am going to assume that the results are lexically restricted, i.e. they are the goal states of the situations denoted by telic predicates. In (35), for example, that goal state would be the swimming pool being clean (see 35a). In the literature, it has also been maintained that the Perfect can focus on *indirect* results, in other words, on results that are not necessarily derived from the meaning of the verbal predicate (Michaelis 1994; Depraetere 1998)¹⁸. In (35), one of those indirect results could be the absence of dead insects floating in the swimming pool (see 35b):

¹⁸ For the concepts of *direct result* and *indirect result*, consult Declerck (2006: 301-307).

- (35) RESULTATIVE PERFECT:
 [Voy a dar=me un baño, que] Juan ha limpiado
go:PRS.1SG to give:INF=me:DAT a:M.SG bath, that Juan have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP
 la piscina.
the:F.SG swimming.pool
 ‘[I am going to take a bath, because] Juan has cleaned the swimming pool.’
 a. La piscina está limpia.
the:F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR:PRS.3SG clean:F.SG
 ‘The swimming pool is clean.’
 b. No hay insectos muertos flotando en la piscina.
not HABER:PRS.3SG insects dead:M.PL float:GER in the:F.SG swimming.pool
 ‘There are no dead insects floating in the swimming pool.’

Indirect results such as the one in (35b) are conversational implicatures. The conversational implicatures are not connected to the properties of Lexical Aspect of the verbal predicate, but to the situation of communication. If they were taken into account to explain the meaning of the resultative Perfect, it could be accepted that the expression of the resultative Perfect is compatible with the expression of other varieties of the Perfect. That is what happens in Michaelis (1994: 140-141): (The italics are mine.)

The existential and continuative Pr[esent]P[erfect]s can have resultant-state implications (...)

- (49) a. I’ve read *De oratore* three times (so I can explain it to you).
 b. I’ve been ill (so I haven’t gotten around to it).

The resultant-state implications attached to (49a,b) are evoked by a hearer attempting to discern the relevance of the PrP-form assertion. The sentences in (49) can be regarded as instances in which two PrP readings are mutually compatible (...) *For example, (49a) has both existential and resultative readings: three readings events have occurred and, as a consequence, the reader now has knowledge of the text in question.*

In order to make compatible the experiential and the resultative aspectual meanings, Michaelis must propose semantic structures that hide a basic coincidence: both Perfects denote a state. Observe that this characteristic is ignored in the semantic structure proposed to explain the experiential interpretation of the *present perfect* (see 36a). According to (36a), in the EPR there is an event that culminates in a temporal interval anterior to the speech time, and that can take place again in the present. There is nothing in that structure related to the stative nature of the experiential Perfect. On the contrary, the structure of the resultative Perfect in (36b) specifies that the state that is a consequence of the event occurs in the moment of speech. The exclamation mark indicates that both the event and the temporal interval are unique:

- (36) a. $\exists e$: Event (e) $\exists t$: $t < \text{now}$ Culminate (e,t) & ‘the event type is one which is replicable at the present moment’
 b. $\exists!e$: Event (e) $\exists!t$: $t < \text{now}$ Culminate (e,t) & ‘e’s results state holds now’
 [Definitions (40) and (47), in Michaelis (1994: 138, 140).]

The immediate consequence of ignoring indirect results as the one in (35b) is the assumption that the resultative reading of the Perfect can only be obtained with

achievements and accomplishments.¹⁹ I have pointed out above that one of the advantages of the analysis of Klein is the consideration of states not as elements that are inserted by the Perfect, but as preexisting entities. In my view, that would mean that states take part in the subeventive structure of the predicates.

To formalize the way in which the Perfect brings into focus the time of the final state of a telic predicate, I will assume the typology of events of Moreno Cabrera (2003). This author distinguishes three basic types of situations: *states*, *processes* and *actions*. Briefly, states are relationships between either entities and properties (*attributive states*), or entities and locations (*locative states*) (see 37a). Processes are defined as relations of transition between at least two states in which the same entity is involved (see 37b). Actions are considered relations of agentivity or causativity between processes and entities: an entity originates, controls or is responsible for the process (see 37c).²⁰

- (37) a. STATE:
 La piscina está {limpia /en el jardín}.
the:F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR:PRS.3SG clean:F.SG /in the:M.SG garden
 ‘The swimming pool is clean/in the garden.’
- b. PROCESS:
 La piscina se limpió.
the:F.SG swimming.pool SE:3SG clean:PST.PFV.3SG
 ‘The swimming pool was cleaned.’
- c. ACTION:
 Juan limpió la piscina.
Juan clean:PST.PFV.3SG the:F.SG swimming.pool
 ‘Juan cleaned the swimming pool.’

In the class of processes there can be certain differences which affect the states that constitute their subeventive structure. I illustrate them in diagrams (38), (39) and (40). The process in (38) is characterized by the fact that it lacks intermediate states between the initial state or origin (s_0) and the final state or target (s_n). The non-existence of intermediate states or, to put it another way, the relation of temporal contiguity between the initial and final states, is associated with the concept of instantaneousness in these processes: (The arrow indicates the transition between two states.)²¹

¹⁹ For this point of view, see, among others, Moens (1987), Moens & Steedman (1988), Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994), Kiparsky (2002), Pancheva (2003), Mittwoch (2008).

²⁰ Consult Moreno Cabrera (2003: 171-198) for a critical review of the proposals by Dowty (1979), Jackendoff (1972, 1990), Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1995), Mateu Fontanals (1997), McCawley (1968), Pustejovsky (1991, 2000) and Van Valin & LaPolla (1997), among others.

²¹ To explain the contrast in (i), García Fernández’s (2006: 99) proposes to add an initial state to the subeventive structure of *reversible* achievements like *salir* (‘go out’), as in (ii). Note that the structure in (ii) does not correspond to an instantaneous process. The durational expression *cinco minutos* (‘five minutes’) would modify the state represented as s_n , i.e. John’s being out:

- (i) a. *Juan marcó un gol cinco minutos.
Juan score:PST.PFV.3SG a goal five minutes
 ‘Juan scored a goal during five minutes.’
 b. Juan salió cinco minutos.
Juan go.out:PST.PFV.3SG five minutes
 ‘Juan went out during five minutes.’
- (ii) $s_0 \Rightarrow s_n \Rightarrow s_0$

(38) *marcar un gol* ('to score a goal')

$$S_0 \Rightarrow S_n$$

The processes in (39) and (40) are not instantaneous. They are characterized by the fact that they imply intermediate states (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{n-1}). These intermediate states receive the name of *trajectory*. There are non-instantaneous processes oriented toward the trajectory, as in (39), and non-instantaneous processes not oriented toward the trajectory, as in (40). The former do not have specific initial and final states, the latter do:²²

(39) *correr por el parque* ('to run through the park')

$$S_1 \Rightarrow S_2 \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow S_{n-1}$$

(40) *limpiar(se) la piscina* ('to clean the swimming pool')

$$S_0 \Rightarrow S_1 \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow S_n$$

The predicate of (40) denotes a non-instantaneous process with specific initial and final states. The examples in (41) show that the intermediate states that constitute the trajectory can be modified independently by adverbs of the type *apenas/medio/casi/totalmente* ('barely/half/almost/totally'):

(41) La piscina está {*apenas/medio/casi/totalmente*} limpia.²³
the.F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR.PRS.3SG barely/half/almost/totally clean.F.SG
 'The swimming pool is barely/ half/almost/totally clean.'

Moreno Cabrera (2011) applies the adjective *attributive* to the trajectory constituted by attributive resultative states like those in (41).²⁴ In that paper he proposes the use of the algebraic structure $(Q, +)$, i.e. the set of rational numbers (Q) with the operation of addition, to model the attributive trajectories. In (42) I take advantage of these same tools to provide an alternative formulation for the meaning of the process *limpiar(se) la piscina* ('to clean the swimming pool'):

(42) *limpiar(se) la piscina*
 $P^0(i) \Rightarrow \underline{P^{1/10}(i)} \Rightarrow P^{1/2}(i) \Rightarrow P^{9/10}(i) \Rightarrow P^1(i)$

²² Moreno Cabrera's states could be equated with Vendler's states (1957); the processes oriented toward the trajectory, with activities; the telic processes, that is, those with specific initial and final states, correspond to accomplishments; and the instantaneous processes, with achievements. Actions inherit the aspectual structure of the processes: *Juan marcó un gol* ('Juan scored a goal') would be an action of achievement; *Juan corrió por el parque* ('Juan ran through the park'), an action of activity; and *Juan limpió la piscina* ('Juan cleaned the swimming pool'), an action of accomplishment (see Moreno Cabrera 2011: 10).

²³ See the examples in (16) in Moreno Cabrera (2011: 13).

²⁴ The concept of *attributive trajectory* is applied to attributive resultative states, but not to attributive episodic states (see Moreno Cabrera 2011: 12). The reason is that the former can be conceived as the final or target states of a process; the latter cannot. We see this in (i). The non-existence of intermediate states in the acquisition of the property denoted by *caro* ('expensive') explains the empty modification and, therefore, the fact that the adverbs *barely, half, almost* and *totally* give rise to ungrammaticality:

(i) La piscina está (*{*apenas/medio/casi/totalmente*}) cara.
the.F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR.PRS.3SG barely/half/almost/totally expensive.F.SG
 'The swimming pool is barely/ half/almost/totally expensive.'

The attributive trajectory is underlined. The upper-case *P* stands for *property*, the letter *i*, for *entity*. With the number *0* the initial state or origin is represented: the swimming pool not being clean. The number *1* represents the final state or target: the swimming pool being clean. The property denoted by the participial adjective *limpia* ('clean') is segmented conventionally into ten parts. Thus, the superscript *1/10* represents the first intermediate state of the trajectory that implies the gradual acquisition of the property denoted by the participial adjective. The superscript $\frac{1}{2}$ indicates the halfway point of the attributive trajectory.

In (43) I add the information about the subeventive structure of the telic process denoted by *limpiar(se) la piscina* ('to clean the swimming pool') in order to represent the Perfective and the resultative Perfect readings of the compound tense *había limpiado* ('s/he had cleaned'). The states that are connected by relations of transition are attributive: the adjective *limpia* ('clean') indicates the property; the noun *piscina* ('swimming pool') indicates the entity. I will ignore for convenience the information related to the entity who is responsible for the process, Juan. In the Perfective reading, TSIT is included in TT (see 43a). TT is represented by square brackets. In the RPR, the goal state is focused on: P¹ (i). The curly brackets are meant to indicate that the time of the goal state includes TT (see 43b):

- (43) Juan había limpiado la piscina a las tres.
Juan have:PST.IPFV.3SG clean:PST.PTCP the:F.SG swimming.pool at the:F.PL three
 'Juan had cleaned the swimming pool at three.'
 a. PERFECTIVE INTERPRETATION:
 [limpia⁰ (piscina) ⇒ limpia^{1/10} (piscina) ⇒ limpia^{1/2} (piscina) ⇒ limpia^{9/10} (piscina) ⇒ limpia¹ (piscina)]
 b. RESULTATIVE PERFECT INTERPRETATION:
 limpia⁰ (piscina) ⇒ limpia^{1/10} (piscina) ⇒ limpia^{1/2} (piscina) ⇒ limpia^{9/10} (piscina) ⇒ { limpia¹ (piscina) }

Observe that both in the Perfective and in the resultative Perfect interpretations the final state is asserted, which is in agreement with Klein's idea that those two aspectual contents involve a *poststate*.

The formulation in (43b) is very similar to that in (44):

- (44) La piscina estaba limpia.
the:F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR:PST.IPFV.3SG clean:F.SG
 'The swimming pool was clean.'
 { limpia¹ (piscina) }

However, there is a crucial difference between them: the state that is focused on in (43b) is regarded as a part of a process; the state that is focused on in (44) is not. In this respect, consider the following quote (Klein 1994: 109, note 2): (The italics are mine.)

In a way, it would be more appropriate to say that *TT has a prettime, and the perfect marks that TSit falls in this prettime (...)* This would bring us, however, in complete disagreement with the common terminology, in which the perfect marks the situation as being 'past and over', and might therefore lead to confusion.

That would explain the contrast in (45). The content in parenthesis can be added to (45a) because there is a trajectory, i.e. a *pretime* in Klein's terms, that can be anaforically referred to by means of the verb *suceder* ('happen'). The same content cannot be added to (45b) for the opposite reason: there is no trajectory or *pretime* to be referred to:

- (45) a. La piscina se ha limpiado. (Esto ha
the:F.SG swimming.pool SE:3SG have:PRS.3SG clean:PST.PTCP. That have:PRS.3SG
 debido de suceder mientras Juan trataba de entretener a Luis.)
must:PST.PTCP of happen:INF while Juan try:PST.IPFV.3SG of entertain:INF to Luis
 'The swimming pool has been cleaned. That must have happen while Juan was trying to entertain Luis.'
- b. La piscina está limpia. (*Esto ha debido
the:F.SG swimming.pool ESTAR:PRS.3SG clean:F.SG. That have:PRS.3SG must:PST.PTCP
 de suceder mientras Juan trataba de entretener a Luis.)
of happen:INF while Juan try:PST.IPFV.3SG of entertain:INF to Luis
 'The swimming pool is clean. That must have happen while Juan was trying to entertain Luis.'

To finish this section, attention should be paid to an atelic predicate such as the one in (46). The formulation below corresponds to the Perfective interpretation of the compound tense. Given that *correr* ('run') is a verb of displacement, the states that constitute its subeventive structure are locative states. *L* stands for *Localization*:

- (46) Juan había corrido por el parque a las tres.
Juan have:PST.IPFV.3SG run:PST.PTCP through the:M.SG park at the:F.PL three
 'Juan had run through the park at three.'
 PERFECTIVE INTERPRETATION:
 [L₁ (Juan) ⇒ L₂ (Juan) ⇒ ... ⇒ L_{n-1} (Juan)]

Note that when we are dealing with an event that does not have a *telos*, the equivalent to Klein's poststate would be the last state included in TT: L_{n-1} (Juan), in (46). In the formulations I am proposing those states are lexically restricted, being either attributive or locative.

The RPR is not available, owing to the fact that the states of the trajectory are qualitatively identical. That is why it is not possible to grammatically distinguish a state which can be conceived as the result of the process. As Moens & Steedman (1988: 19) suggest, a question like (47) would be felicitous just in the case that John's running through the park was understood either as part of a plan previously arranged, or as a task that Juan must finish in order for another thing to happen. Therefore, this would be an example of recategorization of an atelic predicate into a telic one:

- (47) #¿Ha corrido ya Juan por el parque?
have:PRS.3SG run:PST.PTCP already Juan through the:M.SG park
 'Has already run Juan through the park?'

From the point of view that the resultative Perfect brings into focus a part of the time of the goal state of a telic situation, the way compound tenses behave with respect to the stativity tests is absolutely predictable. What needs to be explained now is the behavior of compound tenses in the EPR. This is the topic of the next section.

4.2. Final states in the experiential Perfect reading

One of the problems of Klein's (1992, 1994) description of the meaning of the Perfect is that the *poststate* cannot always be lexically restricted. Obviously, that is what happens with the Perfect of atelic predicates. As I mentioned before, it is strange that the same procedure that sometimes serves to locate the time of a goal state with respect to a reference time can also locate the time of certain states of affairs only contextually determined.

A first step to improve this approach should be to restrict the state of affairs that follows a process that ceases in a non-resultative interpretation. Consider the following quote (Parsons 1990: 234):²⁵

For every event *e* that culminates, there is a corresponding state that holds forever after. This is "the state of *e*'s having culminated," which I call the "Resultant state of *e*," or "*e*'s R-state." If Mary eats lunch, then there is a state that holds forever after: the state of Mary's having eaten lunch (...) It is important not to identify the Resultant-state of an event with its "target" state. If I throw a ball onto the roof, the target state of this event is the ball's being on the roof, a state that may or may not last for a long time. What I am calling the Resultant-state is different; it is the state of my having thrown the ball onto the roof, and it is a state that cannot cease holding at some later time.

According to Parsons (1990), a situation that does not go on, can be related to a state that extends forever, a *resultant* state. That state would correspond to the verbal situation having taken place. As shown below, the resultant state would be part of the meaning of the English present perfect as opposed to the simple past (p. 236):

<p><i>Mary has eaten the apple</i> = For some event <i>e</i>: <i>e</i> is an eating, the agent of <i>e</i> is Mary, the theme of <i>e</i> is the apple, and <i>e</i>'s R-state holds now.</p>	<p><i>Mary ate the apple</i> = For some event <i>e</i>: <i>e</i> is an eating, the agent of <i>e</i> is Mary, the theme of <i>e</i> is the apple, and <i>e</i> culminates before now.</p>
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This proposal has a clear drawback that I mentioned in section 1. The predicate *eat the apple* denotes a situation that culminates both in *Mary has eaten the apple* and in *Mary ate the apple*. So, if every situation that culminates can be related to a resultant state, it is not clear why this resultant state is ignored when the meaning of the simple past is taken into account.

Nonetheless, the proposal by Parsons can be connected with the idea that it is possible to link every situation that ceases or is completed to one predication related to the participation of the subject in the process. Smith (1991: 148) calls this the *participant property*. Smith (1991) attributes the participant property to the present perfect in general. I consider that it must be attributed just to compound tenses with EPR:

Present perfect sentences ascribe to their subjects a property that results from their participation in the prior situation. If at some time Henry has laughed, danced, built a sandcastle, the property of having done these things is asserted of Henry. I will call this the "participant property".

²⁵ The following definition of *consequent state* is equivalent (Vlach 1993: 260): "The consequent state of an eventuality *E* is the state of *E*'s occurring with respect to some past time, and so it begins to hold immediately after *E* occurs and continues to hold forever."

If Parsons (1990) and Smith's (1991) insights are put together, it could be asserted that the sentences in (48) are stative in a sense completely different from the stativity of compound tenses with resultative interpretation. They could be considered as stative because they would attribute to Juan the participation in a process that has taken place. Intuitively, Juan would be described as the possessor in the present of two experiences: the experience of having cleaned the swimming pool (see 48a), and the experience of having run through the park (see 48b):

- (48) a. [Ahora te toca a ti, que] Juan ha limpiado
now you.DAT touch.PRS.3SG to you.OBL, that Juan have.PRS.3SG clean.PST.PTCP
 la piscina en otras ocasiones.
the.F.SG swimming.pool in other.F.PL times.
 '[Now it's your turn, because] Juan has cleaned the swimming pool some other times.'
- b. Juan ha corrido por el parque [, así que puede
Juan have.PRS.3SG run.PST.PTCP through the.M.SG park, so that can.PRS.3SG
 decir=te si es cómodo].
tell.INF=you.DAT if be.PRS.3SG comfortable.M.SG
 'Juan has run through the park, so he can tell you if it is comfortable.'

It is important to draw the attention to a final fact. Note that the examples of experiential Perfects of (48) do not refer to particular moments in which Juan has cleaned the swimming pool or has run through the park. The reference to these processes is generic, as Dahl (1985: 141) suggests: "the sentence must concern a generic activity, state, etc., rather than individual or specific one"; or relative to *types of events*, as in Dahl & Hedin (2000: 387): "the Present Perfect in English may [...] be understood as expressing type-focussing." That means that: "they [i.e. situations] are considered in a non-temporal perspective as abstractions not existing in time but corresponding to the denotative content of some verbal expression" (see Hedin 2000: 228).²⁶

Remember that compound tenses with EPR behave as stative predicates with respect to the stativity tests of section 3, even though the events denoted by *limpiar la piscina* ('to clean the swimming pool') and *correr por el parque* ('to run through the park') are not states. Remember also that the problem of relating this stative behavior to the fact that the Perfect focuses on the time of a state posterior to the verbal event is that the states of the experiential readings are not lexically restricted. In other words, they do not take part in the subeventive structure of the predicate. So, what I propose again is to conceive the state that the experiential Perfect focuses on as a final state.

Take the formulations in (49) and (50):

- (49) a. Haber corrido Juan (ya) por el parque
have.INF run.PST.PTCP Juan (already) through the.M.SG park
 PERFECTO EXPERIENCIAL:

²⁶ In contrast, in the RPR compound tenses would denote specific events. Mittwoch (2008: 343-344) claims:

Moreover, what is involved, is not just singularity. The speaker has to have some minimal knowledge about the singular event beyond the fact that it occurred. At the very least s/he must know that it occurred close enough to the P[erfect]E[valuation]p[oin]t for it still be possible that the result state holds at that point. The result state holds at a specific time; what I am suggesting is that it transmits specificity to the event [...] Specificity has not been discussed, on the best of my knowledge, in relation to events. I tentatively propose that in our case the anchoring would be to the temporal entity provided by the PEpt –directly for the state and indirectly for the event.

$\neg \Sigma (\text{Juan}, \lambda x (L_1(x) \Rightarrow L_2(x) \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow L_{n-1}(x))) \Rightarrow \{ \Sigma (\text{Juan}, \lambda x (L_1(x) \Rightarrow L_2(x) \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow L_{n-1}(x))) \}$

b. Correr (Juan) por el parque ('to run (Juan) through the park'):

i. *As a process:*

$L_1(\text{Juan}) \Rightarrow L_2(\text{Juan}) \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow L_{n-1}(\text{Juan})$

ii. *As a property:*

$\lambda x (L_1(x) \Rightarrow L_2(x) \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow L_{n-1}(x))$

iii. *As a state:*

$\Sigma (\text{Juan}, \lambda x (L_1(x) \Rightarrow L_2(x) \Rightarrow, \dots, \Rightarrow L_{n-1}(x)))$

(50) a. Haber limpiado Juan (ya) la piscina
have.INF clean.PST.PTCP Juan (already) the.F.SG swimming pool

PERFECTO EXPERIENCIAL:

$\neg \Sigma (\text{Juan}, \lambda x (x (\text{limpia}^0(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/2}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{9/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^1(\text{piscina})))) \Rightarrow \{ \Sigma (\text{Juan}, \lambda x (x (\text{limpia}^0(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/2}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{9/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^1(\text{piscina})))) \}$

b. Limpiar (Juan) la piscina ('to clean (Juan) the swimming pool'):

i. *As an action:*

$\text{Juan} (\text{limpia}^0(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/2}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{9/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^1(\text{piscina}))$

ii. *As a property:*

$\lambda x (x ((\text{limpia}^0(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/2}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{9/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^1(\text{piscina}))))$

iii. *As a state:*

$\Sigma (\text{Juan}, \lambda x (x (\text{limpia}^0(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{1/2}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^{9/10}(\text{piscina}) \Rightarrow \text{limpia}^1(\text{piscina}))))$

The letter Σ is used in Moreno Cabrera (2003) to indicate stative situations. In (49a) and (50a) the unique transition between an initial state ($\neg \Sigma (\dots)$) and a final state ($\Sigma (\dots)$) is represented. The sign of negation beside the letter Σ on the left and its absence on the right intends to represent this change of state. Both the initial and the final states are attributive. The entities related by the stative situations are, on the one hand, Juan and the set of individuals that run through the park, obtained by means of the operator lambda from the atelic process of Juan's running through the park (see 49bi-iii); and on the other hand, Juan and the set of individuals that clean the swimming pool, obtained by means of the operator lambda from the telic action of Juan's cleaning the swimming pool (see 50bi-iii).²⁷ Consider to this respect the following quote from Moreno Cabrera (2003: 61): (The translation is mine.)

The attributive states (as in *Juan is intelligent*) are not in general relations between entities, but specifications of properties of entities and, therefore, they denote a set of entities: the entities that have a particular property. Nonetheless, they can be conceived as relations between entities if we define them as relations of membership between entities and sets so that, for example, the ordered pair $\langle \text{Juan}, \text{intelligent} \rangle$ is in the relation denoted by *be intelligent*, if and only if the individual denoted by *Juan* belongs to the set of individuals denoted by *intelligent*.

²⁷ I am indebted to Juan Carlos Monero Cabrera for this suggestion.

Moreno Cabrera proposes to take into account the membership relation of Juan to the set of entities denoted by the non-verbal predicate *intelligent* in order to classify as a state the situation denoted by *Juan is intelligent*. In the same way, what I am proposing is to take into account the membership relation of Juan to the set of entities that run through the park in (49) or that clean the swimming pool in (50) to classify as states the situations denoted by *Juan (ya) ha corrido por el parque* ('Juan has (already) run through the park') and *Juan (ya) ha limpiado la piscina* ('Juan has (already) cleaned the swimming pool') in the EPR of the compound tenses. It can be said that *ser* ('to be') and *estar* ('to be') are the Spanish verbs that express the relation of membership between entities and sets denoted by non-verbal predicates. My proposal is that the relation of membership between entities and sets denoted by verbal predicates would instead be expressed by the experiential Perfect.

To finish, the experiential Perfect, like the resultative, would pick just a part of the time of the final state. That is what the curly brackets mean.

The approach that the representations in (49) and (50) show allows me to explain the behavior of the experiential Perfect with respect to the stativity tests of section 3, and something else as important as that: to lexically restrict the kind of states which are brought into focus in the EPR. I leave it for future research to demonstrate that the final states that are focused on by the experiential Perfect are permanent ones. For that reason they could last forever (see Parsons 1990: 234). Besides, their permanent character would make it possible to focus on a part of the final state that is distant from the initial state. That distance is not possible in the RPR because the goal states would be non-permanent.

I am conceiving the experiential Perfect as a procedure to grammatically obtain changes of states derived from the participation of some entities in generic processes. Note that it is unnecessary to invoke the existence of any kind of conflict between the semantic properties of a selector item and the semantic properties of an unexpected selected item, so that the experiential Perfect can amend the mismatches. Thus, coercion is not at issue.

As regards the annihilation of results mentioned by Klein (1994), it could be attributed to the fact that strictly speaking the experiential Perfect does not allow us to focus on the time of a part of the subeventive structure of a particular event. The remainder of the characteristics reviewed in section 2.2 could also be related to the experiential Perfect reference to types of processes, i.e. quantification or modification by indefinite temporal expressions and by adverbial expressions of manner. The quantifiers and the expressions of temporality and manner provide information to determine the type of event in which some entity participates.

Finally, given that states are types of events in which an entity is involved, my analysis predicts that the EPR can be obtained with stative predicates (see 51). That would confirm Parson's observation that even stative predicates could have resultant states, which surprises Piñon (2014:11):

- (51) a. María ya ha estado enferma.
María already have:PRS.3SG ESTAR:PST.PTCP ill:F.SG
 'María has already been ill.'
 b. Juan ya ha sido voluntario.
Juan already have:PRS.3SG be:PST.PTCP volunteer:M.SG
 'Juan has already been a volunteer.'

5. Conclusions

The stativity tests of section 3 draws our attention towards an important fact: compound tenses with both EPR and RPR behave as stative predicates. So, it is not strange that in the literature it is maintained that the Perfect either inserts states into discourse or is a mechanism of aspectual coercion. Both explanations are meant to transform a content of grammatical Aspect into a content of lexical Aspect. In this paper the purpose has been posed the other way around: to derive the stativity of the Perfect from its nature as a grammatical Aspect content. I have accepted the theory of Aspect of Klein (1992, 1994) and the typology of events of Moreno Cabrera (2003) in order to propose that the Perfect always focuses on final states. The resultative Perfect would bring into focus a part of the time of the goal state of a telic predicate. The experiential Perfect would bring into focus a part of the time of a final state which characterizes the subject as a participant in a generic event, in the sense of Dahl (1985: 141) and Dahl & Hedin (2000: 387).

I have also wanted to insist on a property that the Perfect and the Perfective readings have in common: both of them imply a kind of *poststate*. In the Perfective interpretation, the time of this *poststate* would be included in TT; in the Perfect interpretation, the time of this *poststate* would include TT. In the formulations proposed for those aspectual contents, the concept of *poststate* has been reinterpreted, so that we find attributive or locative states that take part in the subeventive structure of the verbal predicate.

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